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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
upon dissolution of the partnership, may have the partner-
ship property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the
surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing the
respective partners.13 Also it has been held in Illinois that
under the Uniform Partnership Act the surviving partner
has a right to sell and convey, and distribute the proceeds
without the aid of equity. 4
The effect of the De Weese case in interpreting the Uni-
form Partnership Act, is to clear up any confusion that
might previously have existed in this State. Under the
Act a firm may purchase partnership realty in the firm
name, and the laws which govern the powers and liabilities
of partners in their relations with each other and with third
parties as to personal property apply to such realty. In
other words, on the death of a partner, partnership realty
is treated as personalty for all purposes unless the partners
intended otherwise.
RussELL W. SHIPLEY
Revival Of Corporation Terminates Agent's Liability
On Post Forfeiture Contract
Marsh Furniture Company v. Solomon'
The charter of a Maryland corporation was forfeited
in 1955, pursuant to Article 81, Section 204,2 for nonpay-
ment of its 1955 franchise tax, although the State Tax Com-
mission accepted the corporation's payment of its 1956 and
1957 taxes. In July, 1957 defendant president of the cor-
poration, claiming to have no knowledge of the forfeiture
and believing the corporation to have capacity to contract,
created a debt to the plaintiff in the name of the corporation
"Ibid, § 38(1).
"Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Il. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922).
'The Daily Record, Dec. 4. 1958 (Balto. City Court, Md. 1958).
2 7 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 81, §204 which states:
"(a) ... If any domestic corporation shall refuse or neglect to pay
to the State, or the proper officers thereof, any franchise tax, any
gross receipts tax, or any other State tax due by it .... or If any do-
mestic corporation shall refuse or neglect to file an annual report with
the State Tax Commission . . . it shall be the duty of the Comptroller
of the State to certify immediately thereafter to the Governor a list
of kall such corporations . . . and the Governor shall forthwith issue
and publish his proclamation declaring under this section that the
charters of such corporations shall be repealed, annulled and forfeited,
and that the powers conferred by law upon such corporations shall
,be inoperative, null and void, upon the date of the first publication
of such proclamation, without the necessity of proceedings of any kind
either at law or in equity."
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and in the usual course of business. The plaintiff was also
uninformed as to the status of the corporation. Plaintiff
sued defendant personally in Peoples' Court of Baltimore
City on March 26, 1958,1 despite the fact that the dissolved
corporation filed its Articles of Revival, as provided by
Article 23, Section 85,1 on March 19, 1958.
Plaintiff contended that defendant became personally
obligated when he contracted in the name of a corporation
whose charter had been forfeited for a franchise tax de-
linquency, and the subsequent revival of the corporation
did not extinguish this personal liability. Defendant argued
that when the corporation was revived and assumed all
obligations properly incurred on its behalf during the period
of forfeiture, the personal liability, if any, of the agent who
had acted for the corporation during that period was ex-
tinguished.
The Peoples' Court, in allowing plaintiff to recover, did
not deny that a corporation becomes liable for contracts
consummated by its agents during the interval between
forfeiture and revival, but reasoned that the individual
liability of the agent is not automatically absolved by the
reinstatement of the corporation's charter. That court re-
garded the corporation in such circumstances as non-
existent and applied general principles of agency which
make the agent of a non-existent corporation personally
liable.
On appeal the Baltimore City Court reversed. The
Court ruled that under the facts of this case the defendant
was not personally liable for the debt he incurred in the
name of the corporation. The Court emphasized the fact
that plaintiff admittedly extended credit to the corporation
exclusively in the transaction sued upon, and that the
The Daily Record, Oct. 1, 1959 ('Peoples' Court of Baltimore City, Md.
1958).
'2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, §85(d) provides:
"Such revival of the charter of the corporation shall validate all
contracts, acts, matters and things made, done and performed within
the scope of Its charter by the corporation, its officers and agents dur-
ing the time when the charter was void, with the same force and
effect and to all intents and purposes as If the charter had at all
times remained in full force and effect. All real and personal prop-
erty, rights and credits of the corporation at the time its charter be-
came void and of which it was not divested prior to such revival shall
be vested in the corporation, after such revival, as fully as they were
held by the corporation at the time its charter became void. The cor-
poration after such revival shall be liable for all contracts, acts, matters
and things made, done or performed in Its name and on Its behalf
by its officers and agents prior to such revival as If the charter had
at all times remained in full force and effect."
1959]
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parties had business dealing with one another both prior
and subsequent to the forfeiture in 1955. It said:
"The effort to hold the defendant responsible for the
debt is based on a technical situation discovered long
after the sale was made and which was not in con-
templation of the parties at the time of the sale."5
The Court construed the corporation forfeiture and revival
provisions of the Code as a method of securing the prompt
payment of revenue, with the corporation being prohibited
from doing business until its charter is reinstated.
The Court of Appeals has stated that the forfeiture of
a corporate charter by the State Tax Commission for non-
payment of taxes puts an end to the corporate existence,
and the rights of creditors become fixed at that time.0 In
Atlantic Mill & Lumber Realty Co. v. Keefer T the Court
interpreted the effect of such a forfeiture.8
"The intent of the Legislature seems to be clear
that all powers granted to such corporations after for-
feiture shall be inoperative, null, and void. This organ-
ization, whose charter is forfeited, is not legally in
existence as a corporation and cannot function as a
corporation."9
It seems clear that agents incur personal liability by
contracting for a corporation whose charter has been for-
feited and not yet revived, 0 but does this liability persist
if the creditor institutes suit against the agent alone after
the corporation has been revived?
In Deutsch v. Aaron & Lillie Strauss Foundation," suit
was filed against a charitable corporation 2 and its presi-
The Daily Record, Dec. 4, 1958 (Balto. City Court, Md. 1958).
,Callahan v. Clemens, 184 Md. 520, 528, 41 A. 2d 473 (1945), involving
dissolution under MD. CODE (1939) Art. 23, §100 [now 2 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 23, §78].
7 179 Md. 496, 20 A. 2d 178 (1941).
'As provided in MD. CODE (1939) Art. 81, §§152 [now 7 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 81, §204] and 153 [now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, §85] and Art. 23,
§§100, 104, 105 [now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, §84].
1 Supra, n. 7, 499. See also BRUNE, MARYLAND CoRPoRATIoN LAW AND
PRActiCE (Rev. ed. 1953) §406.
10 16 FLECHER, CYCOLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1942) §§8132, 8141. But com-
pare Thompson v. Park Say. Bank, 77 F. 2d 955 (D.C.C.A. 1935) and
Epstein v. Henry, 302 Ill. App. 507, 24 N.E. 2d 266 (1939) where corporate
directors or stockholders were not personally liable for business conducted
after expiration of their charter, involving an extension of the doctrine of
de facto corporations. See BALLANTINE, CORPoRATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) §34.
11 155 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1957).
2 Not wholly Immune in this case.
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dent, individually, for injuries sustained while plaintiff
was enrolled at a summer camp operated by the corpora-
tion. The corporation's charter had been forfeited in 1943
for non-payment of taxes, and was not revived until 1953,
during which time the corporation continued its benevolent
activities. Plaintiff's accident occurred in 1952, but the ac-
tion was instituted after the corporation's revival. In grant-
ing a motion for summary judgment in favor of the in-
dividual defendant, Judge Thomsen, in construing Article
23, Section 85(d), 13 declared that in absence of fraud or
participation in the tort, the officer of the corporation
should not be held personally liable after the charter had
been revived.
In Held v. Crosthwaite,"4 involving the application of a
New Jersey statute 5 similar to that of Maryland, the Court
reached the same conclusion in a contract situation. De-
fendants, insurance brokers, executed a marine policy, in
the name of their company, with plaintiff in 1917. The
Governor of New Jersey had proclaimed the Company's
charter void in 1915 for non-payment of taxes, although
neither party was aware of the forfeiture. When plain-
tiff's ship sank and the underwriter refused to pay for the
loss, the former filed suit against defendants individually,
despite the fact that the Governor had previously revoked
his proclamation and reinstated the company. The Court
rejected plaintiff's contention that defendants had con-
tracted as agents of a non-existent corporation, and left
plaintiff with his remedy against the corporation only. The
Court reasoned that under the statute, the Governor might
proclaim the charter of a tax delinquent corporation for-
feited, and all rights and privileges of that corporation in-
operative and void, but upon payment of the franchise
tax the Governor had the power to repeal his initial proc-
lamation and proclaim the corporate charter revived. Since
it was not within the power of the Governor to create a
new corporation, 6 the second proclamation of reinstate-
'82 MD. CODE (1957).
"260 F. 613 (2d Cir. 1919), discussed in 19 Col. L. Rev. 391. 393 (1919).
Laws of 1905, ch. 259, §§1, 2 and 7 [now 54 N.J.S.A. (1940) 54:11-1,
2 and 5], set out in full supra, 614-615.
Cf. MD. CO NSTITUTON, Art. III, §48:
"Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be
created by special Act, except for muncipal purposes and except in
cases where no general laws exist, providing for the creation of cor-
porations of the same general character, as the corporation proposed
to be created; and any act of incorporation passed in violation of this
section shall be void. All charters granted, or adopted in pursuance
1959]
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ment must be held to relate to the first proclamation of
repeal, and the old corporation must be regarded as hav-
ing continuously existed so far as the State is concerned.17
Absent fraud and knowledge of the, forfeiture, and con-
sidering that both parties intended the company alone to
be liable, the revival proclamation must validate all acts
of such agents from the date of the forfeiture and place
liability in the corporation alone."8
A lower New York Court held to the contrary in
Poritzky v. Wachtel. 9 Notwithstanding the forfeiture of
the charter in 1935, defendant, as president of the corpora-
tion, continued to purchase merchandise in the name of
the corporation from plaintiff until 1937. Plaintiff sued
defendant individually in July, 1940, and moved for sum-
mary judgment in January, 1941. During the litigation,
the corporation was revived. Defendant admitted he would
be liable if no revival had occurred, but argued that the re-
instatement of the charter operated retroactively to re-
store the corporate entity, thereby validating ab initio
the acts of agents acting in behalf of the corporation during
the period of forfeiture. Plaintiff was granted the summary
judgment since the motion was filed before reinstatement
occurred." The Court feared that defendant's interpreta-
tion of the statute2 would promote fraud in that an officer
of a dissolved corporation, who obtained credit, could shift
his personal liability to the corporation merely by paying
the delinquent taxes. It emphasized that this corporation
was closely held and for several years without assets, and
therefore an action against the corporation would be
worthless.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has never construed
Article 23, Section 85 (d) as to its effect upon the status
of this section, and all charters heretofore granted and created, sub-
ject to repeal or modification, may be altered, from time to time, or
be repealed; . .. ."
17 260 F. 613, 616 (2d Cir. 1919).
11 The Court stated that during the interval between the two proclama-
tions the corporation was at least a de facto corporation. 19 Col. L. Rev.,
8upra, n. 14, takes issue with the Court's extension of -the de facto corpora-
tion doctrine.
1176 Misc. 633, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 316 (1941).
20 Ibid., 318 :
"[T]he validity or invalidity of the cause of action upon which the
motion for Summary Judgment is made must depend upon the facts
existing at the time the action was commenced, or at least, at the
time the motion for summary judgment was made." (Italics supplied.)
See RESTATEM NT, AGENCy 2nd (1958) §338, Illustration (2).2 1N.Y. TAx LAW §203-a.
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of a corporation whose charter has been forfeited, nor has
the Court determined the liability of the contracting agent
once the corporate charter has been reinstated. In Red-
wood Hotel, Inc. v. Korbien,22 the Court, in allowing a re-
vived corporation to file an appeal, merely quoted the
statute which provided that such charter revival shall vali-
date all acts done within the scope of its charter by officers
and agents during the time when such charter was void,
with the same force as if said charter had at all times re-
mained in effect." This case, however, did not qualify the
principle enunciated in Atlantic Mill & Lumber Realty Co.
v. Keefer,24 that a corporation, whose charter had been for-
feited and not yet revived, is not legally in existence and
cannot function as a corporation.
Most jurisdictions construing similar revenue statutes,
appear to hold that a corporation is not completely extin-
guished during the period between forfeiture and reinstate-
ment of its charter for non-payment of taxes.25 When the
- 197 Md. 514, 80 A. 2d 28 (1951).
"MD. CODE SuPP. (1947), Art. 81, §153 [now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23,
§85]. See also Seaboard Terminals Corporation v. Standard Oil Co., 35
F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
179 Md. 496, 20 A. 2d 178 (1941).
In J. B. Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkind, 3 N.J. 312, 70 A. 2d 72. 13 A.L.R. 2d
214 (1949), the court followed the reasoning laid down in Held v. Crosth-
waite, 260 F. 613 (2d Cir. 1919), supra, p. 147, discussed in 19 Col. L. Rev.
391, 393 (1919). The New Jersey Statutes, 54 N.J.S.A. (1940) §54:11-2, 5,
being substantially unchanged from those involved in the Held case, 8upra,
n. 14, the court held that a reinstatement of a repealed charter relates
back to the proclamation of repealer and validates corporate action taken
in the interim; it was not the intent of the Legislature to absolutely de-
stroy the corporation upon its failure to pay taxes and upon the Gov-
ernor's proclamation of repeal.
The Court ruled, in Wax v. Riverview Cemetery Co., 41 Del. 424, 24 A.
2d 431, 436 (1942) that:
"Under our taxing statute we think that a corporation which has been
proclaimed for non-payment of taxes is not completely dead. It is in
a state of coma from which It can 'be resuscitated, but until this is
done its powers as a corporation are Inoperative, and the exercise
of these powers is a criminal offense. It still can serve as repository
of title and as obligor of a debt."
4 DEL. CODE ANN. (1953), Tit. 8, §511, and Tit. 8, §312 resemble the Mary-
land Code provisions, supra, ns. 2, 4, relating to forfeiture and revival.
Watts v. Liberty Royalties Corporation, 106 F. 20 941 (10th Cir. 1939)
reached the same conclusion construing this Delaware statute. See also
Dominion Oil Co. v. Lamb, 119 Colo. 62, 201 P. 2d 372 (1949) construing the
Colorado statute, Lyons v. Texorado Oil & Gas Co.. 91 S.W. 2d 375 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935) construing the Texas statute, Gillen-Cole Co. v. Fox &
Co., 146 Ore. 208, 29 P. 2d 1019 (1934), Huey v. National Bank of Fitz-
gerald, 177 Ga. 64, 169 S.E. 491 (1933), McClung v. Hill, 96 F. 2d 236 (5th
Cir. 1938) construing the Florida statute.
See annotation in 13 A.L.R. 2d 1220. See also BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
(Rev. ed. 1946) §34 as to discussion of corporate existence after expiration
of charter.
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statute is intended as a revenue measure26 and provides for
both the revival of the corporation upon payment of delin-
quent taxes and the validation of acts during the period of
suspension, the proclamation of forfeiture for nonpayment
of taxes does no more than forfeit the corporate right to do
business. The corporation is not extinguished as a legal
entity.27
Despite the effect of forfeiture, as provided by Article
81, Section 204, the strength of the language of Article 23,
Section 85(d), as to revival, indicates the absence of an
intent on the part of the Legislature to extinguish a cor-
poration completely during the period between forfeiture
and revival. The latter section clearly declares that the
corporation after such revival shall be liable for all acts
performed in its name by its agents prior to revival as if
the charter had at all times remained in full force and effect.
As long as the agent does not contract for a completely
non-existent principal, there is no reason to hold that agent
personally liable once his disclosed principal has validated
the agent's acts and has assumed liability of its own.
The effect of ratification in agency law is analogous to
the result reached by the Court in this case. When a prin-
cipal ratifies the unauthorized contract of his purported
agent, the agent's liability to the other party to the con-
tract for breach of warranty of authority is terminated.
In its effect on the agent's personal liability, the revival
of a corporation under Article 23, Section 85(d) seems
equivalent in theory to ratification by a principal of un-
authorized conduct.
2 As opposed to an exercise of the State's regulatory or police power.
16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1942) 706 states:
"Reinstatement of the corporation validates previous corporate acts,
unless under the terms of the statute the delinquent corporation is,
during the period of suspension, wholly without power to act or con-
tract and its attempted acts or contracts are entirely void."
Compare Leibson v. Henry, 356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W. 2d 310 (1947), where
corporate directors were held personally liable for unemployment contribu-
tions assessed against the corporation during the continuance of operation
of the business after the charter had 'been forfeited for failure to file
an annual report and anti-trust affidavit. The forfeiture of a corporate
license for failure to file an annual report, etc. operated, in this case. as
an ipso facto dissolution of the corporation, resulting in the corporation's
ceasing to be a corporation de jure and de facto. See also Clark Estate
Co. v. Gentry, 362 Mo. 80, 240 S.W. 2d 124 (1951), Van Landingham v.
United Tuna Packers, 189 Cal. 353, 208 P. 973 (1922), Title Co. v. 4136
Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120 (1937).
'RESTATEMENT, AONCY 2d (1958), §338, MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY
(3d ed. 1923) §163.
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Judge Rhynhart, of the Peoples' Court, held that an
officer who incurred personal liability by contracting in
the name of a corporation during the time its charter was
forfeited should not have the right to escape such liability
by electing to reinstate the corporation. On the other hand,
there is little reason to give the creditor the election of
suing either the agent or the corporation, once the latter
has filed its Articles of Revival. If the corporation is never
revived, the contracting agent remains liable, but once
the revival occurs, the corporation assumes the same lia-
bility it would have had if the charter had remained in
effect. If the charter had not been forfeited, the creditor
would have no such election. It seems unnecessary to give
the creditor more than what he originally expected.29
STEPHEm M. EHUDIN
Tenants Holding Over - Effect Of Election And
Negotiation By Landlord
Donnelly Adver. Corp v. Flaccomio1
The tenant and its predecessors had leased certain prem-
ises since April, 1947 under an original three year lease
and three successive one year leases all on the same terms.
On November 16, 1955, appellant, the tenant, acquired the
interests of the original tenant in the lease which was to
expire on March 20, 1956. On February 29, 1956 tenant wrote
to the appellee-landlord, confirming a previous verbal offer
made by tenant for renewal of the lease at a lower rent
for a five year term. On March 12, landlord's attorney
answered that his client did not wish to lease for less rent
than the previous years. Three days after the lease expired,
March 23, the tenant wrote:
" 'Due to the fact that the present lease has expired,
and as you are aware, we are attempting to renegotiate
a new lease with you.
"'We will continue on the same rental basis from
month to month until such time as we can come to
some agreement as to the future.
,""It can not be considered a hardship that the parties should be held
to their common understanding." Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 F. 613, 617
(2d Cir. 1919).
'216 Md. 113, 140 A. 2d 165 (1958).
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